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I
INTRODUCTION
Researchers have become increasingly aware of opportunities to act as expert
witnesses in various kinds of criminal and civil litigation.  Many, however, are un-
aware of the possibility that they and their data may be subpoenaed in connection
with lawsuits in which they have not been retained as experts or named as parties.
Such situations raise significant concerns about confidentiality of data
(particularly from identifiable research participants) and premature disclosure of
ongoing research.  They also can impose substantial economic and temporal bur-
dens on researchers and disrupt their research programs.  While Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 45 provides protections for researchers whose data are subpoe-
naed for use in litigation,1 the experience of researchers suggests that significant
personal and professional burdens inherent in compelled production of research
data are likely to remain.
This article was prepared for a workshop on judicially compelled disclosure of
researchers’ data and scholars’ testimony, sponsored by the Program for Science
and Law at Georgetown University.  It was intended to lend a real-world flavor
to issues discussed in more detail by others at the workshop.  The article first re-
views a collection of published legal opinions concerning the enforceability of
such subpoenas and then describes researchers’ concerns, focusing on three major
issues: the economic and temporal demands of subpoenas; the impact of
breached promises or expectations of confidentiality on individual privacy and
research interests; and the consequences of releasing incomplete and unpublished
research findings.  The article concludes with suggestions about how the burdens
of compelled disclosure of research data may be minimized without jeopardizing
the legitimate interests of litigants.
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1. See, e.g., Michael Traynor, Countering the Excessive Subpoena for  Scholarly Research, 59 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 127 (Summer 1996), for a discussion of these protections. See generally Paul
D. Carrington & Traci L. Jones, Reluctant Experts, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (Summer 1996),
for a general discussion of the right of litigants to obtain possibly relevant evidence and citizens’ con-
current duty to supply such evidence.
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II
CASES REVIEWED
Because our analysis includes only cases described in published court opin-
ions, it does not provide an estimate of the number of subpoenas and requests for
information to which researchers have actually been required to respond.  A
project conducted in the 1970s, however, identified approximately two dozen so-
cial science researchers who had been subpoenaed or threatened with a sub-
poena, which suggests a higher level of activity than might be inferred from the
number of published court opinions.2 Moreover, some researchers and institu-
tions are often targets of subpoenas because their work focuses on frequently liti-
gated topics.  One member of the legal department of Mount Sinai Medical Cen-
ter reported to us that she has handled numerous requests and subpoenas for
research information, mostly related to epidemiological studies, that Mount Sinai
has not contested.  Similarly, the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) receives
information requests routinely.  An Assistant U.S. Attorney who frequently rep-
resents the CDC reported to us that the agency usually is able to provide suffi-
cient information to meet the requesting party’s needs without compromising its
own interests or formally opposing the request.  Such requests generally are han-
dled by the CDC’s agency counsel; they are referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fice only when the CDC cannot reach a negotiated disclosure agreement with the
requestor.  As it is the policy of both Mount Sinai and the CDC to release infor-
mation unless there is a compelling reason to withhold it, they can deal with most
requests in the ordinary course of business.
Neither are published opinions necessarily representative of the types of liti-
gation in which scientific information is likely to be subpoenaed or of the areas of
research most vulnerable to subpoena.  They reflect only the efforts and opinions
of litigants who had sufficient means to seek scientific information and later to
oppose a motion to quash, and of researchers who had sufficient means to contest
the subpoena.  A comprehensive survey of researchers in various disciplines and
at different types of research institutions would provide more representative in-
formation about researchers’ views of the problems associated with releasing
their data pursuant to subpoena.
Except as described below, we obtained our information about each case
from two sources: the court’s published opinion and telephone interviews in the
summer of 1991 with a researcher named in the subpoena and/or his attorneys.3
                                                          
2. James  D. Carroll & Charles R. Knerr, Report of the APSA Confidentiality in Social Science
Research Data Project, 1975 POL. SCI. 258.
3. Because our task for the workshop was limited to examining a small number of cases to illus-
trate the nature of burdens on researchers and research participants, we did not reinterview our re-
spondents or seek to interview researchers in cases that have been litigated since our initial work. Two
matters of interest that occurred after we had completed our interviews involve requests for disclosure
of research findings related to (1) the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on Alaskan Native commu-
nities and (2) children’s reactions to cigarette advertisements featuring Joe Camel. See Marcia Bari-
naga, Who Controls a Researcher’s Files?, 256 SCI. 1620 (1992); J. Steven Picou, Compelled Disclosure
of Scholarly Research: Some Comments on “High Stakes Litigation,” 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149
(Summer 1996); Eliot Marshall, Court Orders Sharing of Data, 261 SCI. 284 (1993).
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Although time constraints precluded us from interviewing everyone involved in
each subpoena dispute, we attempted to speak with at least one person with first-
hand knowledge of each case.  An outline of the issues covered in the interviews
is presented in the appendix to this article; sometimes, of course, given issues
were more or less relevant to particular cases.  Information about In re Grand
Jury Subpoena dated January 4, 19844 was obtained from the published court
opinions, an amicus curiae brief submitted by three scholarly associations, and an
account of the experience published by the researcher himself.5 Information
about Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation6 was obtained from the court
opinion, an interview with Harold L. Miller, an archivist at the State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, and an article describing the case.7  Finally, information
about Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.8 was obtained only
from the published court opinion.
We describe below, for nine sets of cases, the litigation giving rise to the sub-
poenas, the type of research information subpoenaed, and the outcome of the
subpoena disputes.  We elaborate on the cases later in the article as necessary to
illustrate particular points.
A.  Tobacco/Asbestos Litigation
One set of cases involved the subpoena of information related to studies of
the synergistic effects of cigarette smoking and asbestos exposure in the devel-
opment of cancer.  In one case, various tobacco company defendants sought de-
tailed information about certain studies conducted by Dr. Irving Selikoff, in asso-
ciation with the American Cancer Society, at the Mount Sinai School of
Medicine.  The subpoenas were extremely broad:  They covered ongoing research
as well as studies published in 1968, 1978, and 1979—and demanded production
of, among other things, the following: all documents related to the studies that
“describe, constitute, comment upon, criticize, review, or concern the research
design, methodology, sampling protocol, and/or conduct of any of the studies;”
copies of “questionnaires, answers to questionnaires, interview forms, responses
to interviews, death certificates, autopsy reports, and other cause of death … ;”
and “data sheets, computer tapes and/or copies of computer discs containing all
coded data … in as ‘raw’ a form as possible.”  A New York state trial court
quashed the subpoenas, finding that compliance with them would place an unrea-
sonable burden on Mount Sinai and the American Cancer Society, and would
unduly disrupt ongoing research.9  The tobacco companies did not appeal.
In a similar case, the defendant tobacco companies served narrower subpoe-
                                                          
4. 583 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y.), rev’d and remanded, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984).
5. Mario Brajuha & Lyle Hallowell, Legal Intrusion and the Politics of Field Work: The Impact of
the Brajuha Case, 14 URBAN LIFE 454 (1986).
6. 111 F.R.D. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
7. Harold L. Miller, Will Access Restrictions Hold Up in Court? The FBI’s Attempt to Use the
Braden Papers at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 52 AM. ARCHIVIST 180 (1989).
8. 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
9. In re R.J. Reynolds, 518 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
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nas, requesting information about two of Dr. Selikoff’s published studies.  These
subpoenas requested only computer tapes containing the data underlying the two
studies and documentation necessary to understand the tapes (for example, blank
coding forms and questionnaires, protocol documents, and documents describing
the methods of analysis).  The subpoenas did not seek information about Dr. Se-
likoff’s ongoing research.  Mount Sinai and the American Cancer Society again
moved to quash the subpoenas, but the court denied the motion, instead entering
a protective order that permitted the researchers to redact information identify-
ing research participants and that prohibited the tobacco companies from using
the released data to identify the research participants.10
B.  Litigation Involving the Negligent Design of Intrauterine Devices
Six lawsuits against the manufacturer of an intrauterine device (“IUD”)
known as Copper-Seven were consolidated for discovery.  The plaintiffs claimed
that the IUD had been negligently designed:  A “tailstring” used to determine if
the IUD had been properly inserted, and later to remove it, was alleged to facili-
tate bacterial colonization and migration from the vagina to the uterus.  The al-
leged result was pelvic inflammation, leading to hysterectomies and/or infertility
among IUD users.
Plaintiffs served notice that they would depose Dr. Malcolm Potts, then
president and chief executive of Family International Health (“FIH”), a non-
profit organization.  FIH had conducted a study sponsored by the Agency for In-
ternational Development, comparing IUDs with and without tailstrings (the
“string-no string” study).  The initial subpoena demanded production of seventy-
seven categories of documents and covered not only the “string-no string” study
but all other IUD studies conducted by the organization since 1985.  The plain-
tiffs later narrowed their request to fifty-five categories of documents, but, ac-
cording to Dr. Potts and the court, the subpoena was still very expansive.  Indeed,
Dr. Potts estimated that compliance with the request would entail producing at
least 300,000 pages.  The court found that the burden of producing the research
information outweighed the plaintiffs’ need for it, and quashed the subpoena.11
C.  Dioxin Litigation
The underlying issue in this case was whether the Environmental Protection
Agency should cancel the registration for certain herbicides containing the sub-
stance commonly known as dioxin.  Dow Chemical Company and the class of
veterans in the “Agent Orange” litigation were permitted to intervene.12  An ad-
ministrative subpoena duces tecum required researchers James R. Allen and John
Van Miller of the University of Wisconsin Medical School to produce documents
and records related to four studies of the chemical 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-
                                                          
10. In re American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989); In re American Tobacco Co., 866
F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1989).
11. Anker v. G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
12. In re Agent Orange Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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dioxin, one completed (500 ppt study), one near completion (50 ppt study), and
two in preliminary stages (25 and 5 ppt studies).  The subpoenas defined
“documents and records” broadly as the following:
all letters, memoranda, correspondence, reports, notes, drafts, working papers, proto-
cols for scientific studies, laboratory notebooks, raw data, data compilations, graphs,
charts or papers of any kind, whether hand-written, typed, printed, or reproduced
photostatically or photographically, all film, photographs, videotapes, drawings, or
other visual representations, and all magnetic, mechanical, or electronic recordings or
other form of data compilation.  The term “documents and records” does not include
articles published in recognized scientific journals of wide circulation.
The administrative law judge quashed the subpoena with respect to the 500
and 50 ppt studies because of an understanding that this information would be
turned over voluntarily, but denied the motion to quash with respect to the 25
and 5 ppt studies.  Pursuant to a de novo review, the district court quashed the
subpoenas, finding that (1) the probative value of the 25 and 5 ppt studies was
limited because the studies were incomplete and their findings inconclusive,
(2) Dow’s need for the information was not great because Allen was no longer
scheduled to testify at the cancellation hearing, EPA did not intend to introduce
any of the documents or information sought by Dow, and the information about
the 25 and 5 ppt studies was not needed to evaluate the 500 and 50 ppt studies,
and (3) producing information related to incomplete studies that have not been
peer reviewed would place a substantial burden on researchers.  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.  The district court or-
dered Dow Chemical to pay attorneys’ fees incurred by the researchers and in-
tervening veterans in opposing the subpoenas.13
D.  Utility Vehicle Litigation
One set of cases stemmed from the publication of the report On-Road Crash
Experience of Utility Vehicles by the Highway Safety Research Institute of the
University of Michigan (now the University of Michigan Transportation Re-
search Institute).  That report provided preliminary evidence that utility vehicles
in general, and Jeep CJ-5 models in particular, experienced a disproportionately
high rollover rate in accidents.  In numerous products liability suits involving
Jeeps and other utility vehicles, plaintiffs’ experts relied or intended to rely on
facts and opinions in the report.  In several of these suits, defendants American
Motors Corporation and its subsidiary, Jeep Corporation, served subpoenas on
the report’s principal author, Professor Richard G. Snyder, to produce and testify
at a deposition about all research data, memoranda, drafts, correspondence, lab
notes, reports, calculations, moving pictures, photographs, slides, statements, and
the like pertaining to the study.14
                                                          
13. Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 494 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff’d, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir.
1982); Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 578 F. Supp. 468 (W.D. Wis. 1982).  For a more in-depth discussion
of the dioxin litigation, see Barbara B. Crabb, Judicially Compelled Disclosure of Researchers’ Data: A
Judge’s View, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 21-22 (SUMMER 1996).
14. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211 (D. Ariz. 1987); Buchanan v. American Motors Corporation, 697
F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1983); Wright v. Jeep Corporation, 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
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In Buchanan v. American Motors Corporation, the district court quashed the
subpoena on the grounds that it was unreasonably burdensome, as it would re-
quire an eminent expert who was a stranger to the litigation to spend a great deal
of time explaining the raw data that led him to his opinions.  The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed.  While the appeal in Buchanan was
pending, however, the district court in Wright v. Jeep Corporation reversed a
magistrate’s order quashing an identical subpoena.  Although the Wright court
ruled that Professor Snyder would be required to testify, it also held that he was
entitled to a reasonable fee for doing so, “not only a professional fee and the cost
of supplying the documents and remuneration for the inconvenience, but also …
a charge for a portion of the expenses of the original research.”15 The court also
indicated that the interested persons should submit other proposals for minimiz-
ing the burden imposed by the subpoena.  The Wright case settled before Profes-
sor Snyder was deposed.  Even after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Buchanan, the
same district judge who decided Wright decided the same issue in another case,
again ruling that Professor Snyder would be required to testify.  That case was
also settled before Professor Snyder was deposed.
E.  DES Litigation
In 1972, Dr. Arthur Herbst created the Registry for Hormonal Transplacental
Carcinogenesis (“the Registry”) at the University of Chicago.  The Registry
monitors the clinical, pathological, and epidemiological aspects of clear cell ade-
nocarcinoma, and is the only centralized repository of data on that disease.  Be-
cause the work of Dr. Herbst and others posited an association between the dis-
ease and in utero exposure to the drug diethylstilbestrol (“DES”), the
information collected by the Registry is relevant to products liability suits stem-
ming from the use of DES by pregnant women.
In connection with a number of such suits against it, DES manufacturer E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., served Dr. Herbst with a subpoena to testify and to produce
the records of every person in the Registry who has clear cell adenocarcinoma of
the genital tract and every person with a history of exposure to DES or other syn-
thetic estrogens.  The subpoena also demanded production of records and testi-
mony about investigative techniques used by the Registry, including question-
naires, protocols, and statistical and computer analyses.  Finally, the subpoena
called for all drafts and final articles, studies or reports prepared or published re-
ferring to the Registry data.
The district court quashed these subpoenas,16 concluding that Squibb had not
made an adequate showing of what it hoped to prove by access to the Registry
data.  The fact that Dr. Herbst would not be a witness for the plaintiffs at trial,
the court said, tended to reduce Squibb’s need for the data.  As will be further de-
scribed below, the appellate court disagreed, and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings, ordering it to fashion an appropriate protec-
                                                          
15. Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 877.
16. Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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tive order, taking into account Squibb’s need for the information as well as Dr.
Herbst’s and the Registry’s legitimate interests.17
F.  Tampon-related Toxic Shock Syndrome Litigation
In the 1980s, Procter & Gamble Company (“P&G”) found itself the target of
numerous products liability cases alleging that its “Rely” brand tampon caused
toxic shock syndrome, a rare but sometimes fatal disease.  In these cases, plain-
tiffs’ experts based their opinions in part on a study by the Centers for Disease
Control (“CDC”) that showed a link between the syndrome and the use of tam-
pons, particularly Rely.  To prepare for and blunt the effect of the experts’ testi-
mony, P&G sought full disclosure of certain records and documents pertaining to
the CDC study.  The CDC records comprised information obtained from health
care providers and others.  The information included medical records and the re-
sponses of women who answered questions about their medical history, sexual
practices, contraceptive methods, pregnancy histories, menstrual activity, tampon
usage, and douching habits.
CDC wanted to remove from the documents before production all informa-
tion that would allow identification of study participants who did not consent to
release of information pertaining to them.  P&G pressed for identifying informa-
tion to enable it to contact the subjects of the CDC investigations personally, “to
determine whether the studies were properly conducted.” Declining to rule on
the CDC’s claim of a general confidential privilege for information provided by
study participants, the courts in the reported decisions invoked Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c) and quashed the subpoenas to the extent they sought pro-
duction of identifying information.18
G.  Sociological Study of the American Restaurant
Mario Brajuha, a sociology graduate student, was preparing his dissertation
on the sociology of the American restaurant.  To conduct the necessary research,
Mr. Brajuha worked as a waiter in a restaurant, keeping a journal of his observa-
tions and conversations with co-workers.  During the course of his study, a fire
broke out in the restaurant under suspicious circumstances.  A federal grand jury
investigating the matter subpoenaed Mr. Brajuha to testify and to produce his re-
search journal.  He testified fully about his observation of events at the restaurant
but refused to provide his several hundred page journal.  Although the district
court quashed the subpoena, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case
for further proceedings, 19 as more fully discussed below.
                                                          
17. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
18. Lampshire v. Procter & Gamble Co., 94 F.R.D. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1982), vacated, 708 F.2d 732
(11th Cir. 1983) (unpublished table decision); Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 101 F.R.D. 355
(N.D. Ga. 1984), aff’d, 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
19. In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated January 4, 1984, 583 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y.), rev’d and re-
manded, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984).
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H.  Personal Archives Donated to a State Historical Society
In its defense of a civil rights suit by the National Committee Against Repres-
sive Legislation (“NCARL”) and its executive director Frank Wilkinson, the FBI
sought the production of personal papers of NCARL members Carl and Anne
Braden.  After Carl Braden’s death, Anne Braden had made a restricted dona-
tion of the papers to the State Historical Society of Wisconsin; the Society was to
grant others access to the documents only with her permission.  In Wilkinson v.
Federal Bureau of Investigation,20 the court issued an order granting access to the
FBI, but also providing Braden thirty days to assert privilege as to documents
that raised concerns regarding First Amendment rights to freedom of association.
The court reasoned that the documents remained within at least partial control of
the donor, and would have been fully discoverable had the Bradens kept the pa-
pers in their basement rather than donating them to the Historical Society.  In the
meantime, Ms.  Braden and the FBI disagreed about the breadth of the court or-
der—the FBI maintained that the order pertained to the entire Braden collection
whereas she felt that it pertained only to the papers concerning NCARL.  Ms.
Braden claimed privilege as to about one-half of her NCARL files; the district
court judge found this claim disingenuous and issued a second order requiring her
to open up her entire collection to the FBI.  The underlying litigation was settled,
however, before Ms.  Braden produced the papers she considered privileged.
Anne Braden was not a third-party researcher—indeed, she was a member of
the plaintiff class in Wilkinson—and thus arguably waived her right to keep the
papers confidential.  We nevertheless include this case because the archivists at
the State Historical Society expressed concerns about the current trend for or-
ganizations and even private individuals to destroy documents as soon as it is fea-
sible to do so, for fear that they will be subpoenaed or otherwise be made public.
Archivists fear that, if donors’ requests to restrict access to documents such as
Ms. Braden’s are not honored, important historical information will be lost and
scholars’ ability to conduct research will be diminished.
I.  Research on Organizational Decisionmaking
Richards of Rockford, Inc. (“Richards”), a manufacturing company that had
contracted to supply certain equipment to Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (“PG&E”),
sued PG&E for breach of contract and defamation.  Richards deposed a Harvard
professor who had recently interviewed employees of PG&E as part of a research
project examining how utilities make environmental decisions.  The professor
also had interviewed employees of five other utility companies.  At his deposi-
tion, the professor refused to disclose the identity of the employees interviewed
or the content of the interviews.  Richards moved to compel the professor’s re-
search assistant to reveal the employees’ identities and to produce any existing
interview notes.  The court denied this motion, finding that the public interest in
maintaining confidential relationships between academic researchers and their
                                                          
20. 111 F.R.D. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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sources outweighed the plaintiff’s interest in the subpoenaed information because
the information sought was largely supplementary with respect to the contract
claim and there was no prima facie evidence that the plaintiff was defamed during
interviews with the professor.21
III
CONCERNS RAISED BY SUBPOENAS TO RESEARCHERS
Absent a clear privilege mandating protection of the subpoenaed informa-
tion, courts deciding disputes over subpoenas seeking relevant data in the posses-
sion of an expert not retained for purposes of the litigation balance the interests
of litigants, researchers, and, in certain instances, research participants.22  Courts
have focused primarily on the interests of the researcher (or of science in general)
in protecting the future flow of information, or in honoring promises of confiden-
tiality.  With rare exceptions, the privacy interests of individual research partici-
pants are not directly represented in this type of dispute.23  Nevertheless, as will
be seen, courts sometimes base their decisions on such interests (see, for example,
the toxic shock cases discussed below).  Although the interests of researcher and
research participant are conceptually distinct, they often converge; for conven-
ience, we will address them together.
We treat the subpoenas described here as though they sought only the pro-
duction of documents, with testimony, if any, limited to authentication of the
documents.  We do not address the question of whether, and under what condi-
tions, a court may compel the opinion testimony of unretained expert witnesses.
Although that question is implicated in some of the cases we describe (for exam-
ple, Wright v. Jeep Corp.24), our task was narrower.  Suffice it to say that compel-
ling researchers to prepare for and testify at a deposition and/or at trial about
their research and opinions would substantially increase the burdens described
herein.
Our review of the published opinions and our interviews were directed to ob-
taining information about how researchers perceived the court’s balancing test,
and how the experience and the court’s decision affected the scientist’s work.  In
the cases reviewed, researchers argued, among other things, the following: that
compelled disclosure of scientific information in the requested manner would
violate the privacy rights of individual research participants and force the re-
searchers to breach promises of confidentiality; that the breach of such promises
or equivalent expectations would detrimentally affect future research; that scien-
tists suffer reputational harm from premature disclosure of incomplete research
                                                          
21. Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
22. A detailed explanation of the rules governing the enforcement or quashing of subpoenas for
scientific information is beyond the scope of this paper.  For discussion of such, see Carrington &
Jones, supra note 1, Crabb, supra note 13, and Traynor, supra note 1.
23. Gary B. Melton, When Scientists are Adversaries, Do Participants Lose?, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 191 (1988).
24. 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
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and embarrassment from disclosure of unpublished materials such as drafts and
notes; and that compliance with the subpoena would cause substantial economic
and temporal burdens.  We now turn to some of the arguments used to oppose
enforcement of subpoenas of research data and consider how these arguments
fared.
A.  Economic and Temporal Burdens
1.  Burdens of Complying with Discovery Requests.  Researchers may object
to subpoenas on the grounds that compliance would be unduly expensive, time-
consuming, and disruptive of their research productivity.  Where production as
requested would be unduly burdensome, courts may order that discovery not be
had.25  Wildly overbroad subpoenas are the most likely to elicit this response from
courts, particularly where the information they target is only marginally relevant
to the underlying litigation.  For example, the court in Anker v. G.D. Searle &
Co.26 quashed the subpoenas directed to the research of Dr. Malcolm Potts
because the subpoenas were overbroad and burdensome.  Dr. Potts had
conducted a study comparing IUDs with and without tail strings that was relevant
to the litigation.  The initial subpoena covered not only this study but also all
other IUD studies conducted by Dr. Potts during several preceding years.  The
plaintiffs later narrowed the request, but, even so, much of the information
sought was not directly related to the underlying issues in dispute.  Moreover,
some of the documents requested were already publicly available.  Dr. Potts
estimated that complying with the subpoena would have stopped the activities of
his organization for two to three weeks as employees assembled and produced
over 300,000 pages of documents.  The plaintiffs did not even offer to compensate
him for complying with the subpoena.  Dr. Potts’s motion to quash the subpoena
was granted because the court found that the burden of producing the research
information outweighed the plaintiffs’ need for it.  The court also stated the
subpoena was so unmanageable that an effort by the court to narrow it was not
justified.  The court rejected the assertion of a statutory or common-law privilege
for academic or scientific researchers, but stated that Dr. Potts’s status as a
nonparty and involuntary expert witness was one factor to be considered.
Where the information is clearly related to the litigation and should be pro-
duced in some form, courts may take an intermediate position and narrow overly
broad discovery requests.27  Cases illustrating this intermediate position, such as
Deitchman v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,28 are discussed in more detail later in this
article.
Research information was produced pursuant to a subpoena in four of the
matters we reviewed in Part II of this article,29 and was produced “voluntarily” in
                                                          
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
26. 126 F.R.D. 515 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
28. 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
29. In re American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989); In re American Tobacco Co., 866
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a fifth.30  One case involved a subpoena by a grand jury pursuant to a criminal in-
vestigation.  The other four cases involved subpoenas by defendants in civil suits.
Two additional subpoenas in personal injury suits involving utility vehicles were
not quashed, but the underlying litigation was settled before the information was
produced.  At least three of the four defendants who received research informa-
tion compensated the researchers for costs incurred in providing the informa-
tion.31
The direct burden on researchers’ time, and therefore the effect on their sci-
entific productivity, can be overstated.  For example, redaction of the data in
American Tobacco required none of Dr. Selikoff’s personal time.  Statisticians
and computer specialists at the American Cancer Society and on Dr. Selikoff’s
staff did all the necessary work.  Similarly, records produced from the DES Reg-
istry were prepared for production by clerical personnel and supervised by re-
search assistants.  Only after the research assistants had reviewed the redacted
documents did Dr. Herbst perform a final check to ensure that no identifying in-
formation remained in the documents that would be released.  Anne Braden,
rather than the Wisconsin State Historical Society, prepared her documents for
release.  Finally, there was no evidence from the reported decision that any ex-
traordinary effort would be required for Mario Brajuha to prepare his journal for
release to the grand jury, although such work is by its very nature painstaking, if
not effectively impossible.  Still, to the extent that laboratories are disrupted or
direct supervision by principal investigators is required, the burden of production
can be significant.
Our analysis of the reported decisions suggests that courts make reasonable
attempts to limit the burdens on researchers.  In the cases reviewed, compliance
with subpoenas did not place undue demands on the principal investigators’ own
time or resources.  However, the burdens on the principal investigators’ staff and
others involved can be great, and it is not difficult to envision situations in which
compliance with subpoenas would place severe temporal, and perhaps economic,
demands on researchers.  Whether a subpoena places an extraordinary demand
on a researcher depends on the nature of the information request and the re-
searcher’s circumstances.  For example, what type of information is to be re-
leased?  What type of preparatory work must be done before its release?  Must
the researcher personally do the work or can the work be delegated to a member
of the researcher’s staff?  Does the researcher have a staff to whom the work can
be delegated?  Would the time required interfere with the completion of ongoing
research? Would the disruption threaten professional development (for example,
                                                          
F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1989); Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 111 F.R.D. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1986);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated January 4, 1984, 583 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y.), rev’d and remanded,
750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984); Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
30. Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 494 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
31. We were unable to ascertain whether the FBI compensated Anne Braden for the costs in-
curred in her initial release of documents.  In any event, the underlying case was settled before Ms.
Braden was forced to prepare the entire collection for the FBI’s perusal.
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completion of a thesis or progress toward tenure)?
2.  Burdens of Litigating Discovery Requests.  Opposing or negotiating the
breadth of a subpoena may itself place significant demands on researchers.
Most of the researchers in the cases we reviewed received extensive monetary
and nonmonetary support from a party to the litigation, from their institutions,
and/or from professional organizations in meeting these demands.  None of the
researchers were required to pay for legal representation.  Legal counsel for
Irving Selikoff was provided by Mount Sinai Medical Center.  Similarly, legal
counsel for Richard Snyder (at least before his retirement) and Arthur Herbst
was provided by their universities or research institutes.  Mario Brajuha
received pro bono representation from a New York attorney and later from a
legal clinic associated with New York University Law School, but only after
university counsel refused to represent his interests and he had testified in
court unrepresented.  Legal representation of Malcolm Potts was provided
largely by the defendant in the underlying litigation, although the organization
for which Dr.  Potts worked also employed independent counsel.  In the dioxin
litigation, the researchers’ legal fees were paid by the class of veterans in the
Agent Orange case.32
Researchers whose opposition to a subpoena is handled by counsel for one of
the party litigants may not incur legal fees, but they should be aware that such
representation can be offered only to the extent that the researchers’ interests are
aligned with those of the litigant whom the attorney represents.  As a result, in-
termediate positions that may be acceptable to researchers may not be advanced
by counsel for a party whose main interest is in preventing all disclosure of the re-
search.  Similarly, counsel for such a party may be considerably less concerned
than the researcher about participant privacy or implications of disclosure for fu-
ture research.
Two researchers were supported by amicus briefs submitted to the court by
their professional organizations.  Three briefs were submitted on behalf on Mario
Brajuha; one by three professional associations, one by the American Association
of University Professors, and one by the New York Civil Liberties Union.  Simi-
larly, two amicus briefs supporting the archivists’ interests were filed in Wilkin-
son.33 One brief was prepared by an organization representing oral historians, li-
brarians, and historians.  The Society of American Archivists decided the facts of
the case were not strong enough to warrant joining in the brief.  The other brief
was filed on behalf of the State Historical Society by the Wisconsin Attorney
General.  This brief described a state statute, enacted at the request of the State
Historical Society, authorizing restrictions on access to archives.  In addition, af-
fidavits cited in Andrews v. Eli Lilly34 show extensive professional support for Dr.
Herbst’s resistance to disclosure of the DES Registry information.
                                                          
32. In re Agent Orange Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
33. Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 111 F.R.D. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
34. 97 F.R.D. 494 (1983).
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Only two researchers reported that their home institutions did not play a suf-
ficiently supportive role during their subpoena disputes.  Mr. Brajuha has de-
scribed in detail the vacillating level of university and departmental support he
received.35  Dr. Van Miller reported that his university was slow to recognize the
effects of the legal proceedings on his ability and the ability of other graduate
students to complete their thesis work.
In sum, most researchers in the cases reviewed appear to have received at
least minimally adequate support in opposing subpoenas of their research.  It
may be unreasonable to assume, however, that all researchers faced with a sub-
poena will receive a similar level of support; indeed, researchers who do not re-
ceive support are unlikely to be able to contest subpoenas and therefore would
not be the subject of published opinions.
B.  Confidentiality of Data and Privacy of Research Participants
Notwithstanding the breadth of the typical “opening bid” subpoena, litigants
seeking disclosure of research information are often uninterested in the identity
of study participants.  They seek information about the researcher’s work be-
cause they are likely to be faced at trial with an expert whose testimony will be
based on that work.  In these instances, aggregated data and information about
the methods used in the study may be sufficient for the litigants’ purposes.  Even
where disaggregated data are needed, for example, where a reanalysis of raw data
will be performed, the identities of the data sources are often unimportant.  The
experts with whom we spoke were unanimous in their belief that disclosure of
data is appropriate only if sources are sufficiently disguised, as by removal of
identifying information.  Typically, they asserted the privacy interests of their
subjects (which, in some instances, had led them to promise their subjects confi-
dentiality) and their belief that disclosure of confidential information, particularly
individual participant data, would jeopardize researchers’ ability to obtain candid
information in future research.
The Andrews/Deitchman set of cases, in which DES manufacturer E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., sought to compel production of all information in the Uni-
versity of Chicago’s DES Registry, implicated both the privacy interest of pa-
tients and the researcher’s interests in future data collection.  A brief description
of the Registry and of how it obtains information will illustrate the point.
Dr. Herbst began the DES Registry by requesting information from physi-
cians worldwide about all women born after 1940 who had contracted clear cell
adenocarcinoma of the genital tract.  In every case, Dr. Herbst promised the
submitting physician that the information received would be maintained in confi-
dence.  Once records were received for an individual patient, Dr. Herbst would
contact her and her mother’s obstetrician to request additional records and in-
formation about the use of DES.  In his subsequent contacts with patients and
their mothers’ physicians, confidentiality of the information was again assured.
By this assurance, Dr. Herbst intended to promise that the information received
                                                          
35. See Brajuha & Hallowell, supra note 5, at 468-70.
WIGGINS.FMT 08/13/97  2:25 PM
80 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 59:  No. 3
would be used for research purposes only and would be released only in a form
that did not allow identification of any patients.  Monitoring of adenocarcinoma
patients was ongoing when the Andrews/Deitchman cases were decided; data
were expected to be received well into the 1990s, as the use of DES for pregnant
women was not proscribed until 1971.
Dr.  Herbst believes, and argued in his effort to quash the broad subpoena of
every document in the Registry, that release of individually identifiable informa-
tion would violate the privacy rights of the patients whose medical information is
contained in the Registry.  He also believes release of information traceable to
particular submitting physicians would be a breach of his promise of confidenti-
ality.  Physicians who had administered the drug to the patients’ mothers could
very well fear that release of the information would encourage lawsuits that
would not otherwise be filed.
Dr. Herbst also argued that the effects of breaching his promises of confiden-
tiality would be devastating for the Registry and for other researchers.  He sub-
mitted the affidavits of numerous researchers and contributors to the Registry to
illustrate the general and specific harms that would result from release of confi-
dential information.  Squibb appeared to concede that the loss of confidentiality
would adversely affect the Registry, and was willing to have identifying informa-
tion removed from the data, although it is not clear that Squibb expressed this
willingness before the issue was litigated.  Dr. Herbst maintained that the task of
deleting identifiers was “herculean” and could not be completed by the date of
trial which, because the subpoena was not served until the eve of trial on the
merits, was imminent.  He also argued that the material in the Registry contained
so much individualized information that the identity of patients and doctors could
be traced even if the names were deleted.  The district court agreed that Squibb’s
eleventh hour proposal to redact the records was unworkable, and that the Regis-
try would be “little short of devastated if confidential information in the Registry
[was] disclosed to outsiders, such as Squibb,” concluding, “We will not jeopardize
the vital mission of the Registry, and future of the medical profession’s ability to
understand and combat this truly dreaded and dreadful disease for the sake of the
speculative and uncertain interest Squibb asserts.”36
The appellate court gave considerably more weight to Squibb’s need for the
data.  It was undisputed that Dr. Herbst’s published articles would be used by the
plaintiffs against Squibb, even though Dr. Herbst himself would not testify.  As a
result, the court observed, Squibb was threatened with “having Dr. Herbst as a
potent expert witness against it without his even taking the stand or being subject
to cross-examination.”37  Moreover, the court regarded the confidentiality prob-
lem as surmountable.  Measures to preserve confidentiality, the court mused, are
“easily contrived, especially if one does not confine the protection to mere dele-
tion of informants’ names from copies of papers furnished.”38  The appellate court
                                                          
36. Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494, 502 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
37. 740 F.2d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 1984).
38. Id. at 560.
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therefore vacated and remanded the matter for further proceedings, ordering the
district court to fashion an appropriate protective order taking account of the in-
terests of all concerned.  The opinion makes it clear, however, that patient confi-
dentiality is an entirely appropriate interest to be accommodated; the appellate
court did not hold that identifying information should be released.39
In some cases, of course, the identity of the research participants is precisely
the information sought.  In the Farnsworth and Lampshire cases, for example,
Procter and Gamble sought the names and addresses of women who participated
in the CDC’s study of toxic shock syndrome so the company could validate the
CDC’s results by re-interviewing the participants.  Recall that participants had
provided information about such subjects as their medical, menstrual, and preg-
nancy histories, tampon usage, sexual and contraceptive practices, and douching
habits.  Although the information had been gathered without a promise of confi-
dentiality (the CDC generally does not provide such guarantees), the CDC as-
serted that production would violate the participants’ privacy rights.  The CDC
did attempt to contact all the participants to relay P&G’s request, and released
the names and addresses of participants who consented to such release.  The
CDC was unwilling to divulge identifying information about the other partici-
pants, although all other data were supplied.  The Lampshire court concluded
that personal identifying information about the CDC subjects should be redacted
from all produced documents, stating:  “It is imminently [sic] appropriate to pro-
tect the subjects of the CDC studies, who may have no connection with this law-
suit, from questions by strangers about such personal matters.”40  The district
court in Farnsworth also agreed with the CDC that the research participants
should be protected from the potential embarrassment and annoyance attendant
to disclosure of their identities to P&G.  That court, however, also focused on the
effect of such embarrassment and annoyance on future research.  The court rea-
soned that there was a compelling social interest in promoting research of the sort
conducted by the CDC, and that the possible future harm to the CDC’s public
health mission from disclosure outweighed P&G’s need for the information.  The
P&G argument that access to the withheld information would help it to demon-
strate flaws in the CDC’s results was, the court concluded, “undercut by the in-
creasing amount of research, including some funded by Procter & Gamble, that
supports the CDC’s finding of some relationship between [toxic shock syndrome]
and tampon usage.”41
                                                          
39. The DES cases also illustrate the snail’s pace of high stakes litigation. The cases covered by
the reported opinions appear to have been filed in 1982 and 1983. These federal court cases ultimately
settled before trial. In the interim, other cases were filed in state court, and the subpoena issues dis-
cussed in Andrews/Deitchman also arose there. After procedural wrangling and much negotiation, the
parties reached agreement on a method of producing the requested data stripped of its identifiers.
When we spoke with Dr. Herbst on August 8, 1991, the first batch of Registry documents being pro-
duced to Squibb had just been readied for shipment.
40. Lampshire v. Procter & Gamble Co., 94 F.R.D. 58, 60 (N.D. Ga. 1982), vacated, 708 F.2d 732
(11th Cir. 1983) (unpublished table decision).
41. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 101 F.R.D. 335, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff’d, 758 F.2d
1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the disclosure of the identifying
information could seriously damage the voluntary reporting on which the CDC
relied: “Even without an express guarantee of confidentiality there is still an ex-
pectation, not unjustified, that when highly personal and potentially embarrassing
information is given for the sake of medical research, it will remain private.”42
Frustration of that expectation, the court implied, would harm the CDC’s ability
to collect sensitive medical information.  The appellate court’s reasoning is sup-
ported by research showing that compliance with requests for information may
depend more on a person’s trust that the soliciting agency will use the informa-
tion appropriately rather than on explicit guarantees of confidentiality.43
Faced with similar arguments, but different facts, the Second Circuit reached
a conclusion different from that of the Eleventh Circuit.  In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena arose from a grand jury investigation into arson at a restaurant where soci-
ology graduate student Mario Brajuha was conducting fieldwork while employed
as a waiter.  Petitioning the court to quash the subpoena ordering production of
fieldnotes summarizing his conversations with restaurant employees, Mr. Brajuha
stated that “many” of the research sources identifiable from the notes had been
promised confidentiality.  Without fully developing the facts relevant to Mr.
Brajuha’s claim, the district court granted his motion to quash.  Citing a limited
federal scholar’s privilege analogous to the limited news reporter’s privilege rec-
ognized in Branzburg v.  Hayes,44 the district court concluded that, in this case,
societal interests in fostering research outweighed the government’s interests in
obtaining information about possible criminal activity.
In an amicus curiae brief, the American Sociological Association, the Ameri-
can Political Science Association, and the American Anthropological Association
explained the importance of maintaining the confidences of sources in a field
study such as Mr.  Brajuha’s, citing a letter by John Lofland, then chair of the
American Sociological Association’s Committee on Professional Ethics:
Ethically, social scientists have desired not to harm people who have been kind
enough to make them privy to their lives.  At the level of sheer civility, indeed, it is
rankly ungracious to expose to public view personally identified and inconvenient
facts on people who have trusted one enough to provide such facts! Strategically,
fieldwork itself would become for all practical purposes impossible if fieldworkers
routinely aired their raw data—their fieldnotes—without protecting the people stud-
ied.  Quite simply, no one would trust them.  Analytically, fieldworkers in particular
and social scientists in general are not muckrakers or investigative reporters (as im-
portant as these roles are).  Their goal, as researchers, is not moral judgment or social
change, but understanding.  Concealment of specific identities helps everyone focus
on whatever generic topic may be at issue, avoiding deflection into personalistic mat-
ters.45
The amicus brief also described the organizations’ positions with respect to
                                                          
42. Farnsworth, 758 F.2d at 1547.
43. See generally Eleanor Singer et al., Confidentiality Assurances and Response: A Quantitative
Review of the Experimental Literature, 59 PUB. OP. Q. 66 (1995).
44. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
45. Amici Curiae Brief of the American Sociological Association, American Political Science As-
sociation, and Anthropological Association (2d Cir. 1984) (No. 84-6146), at app. 1.
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the confidentiality of information obtained from research participants.  Of par-
ticular interest was the ASA’s Code of Ethics, which prescribed the following:
“Confidential information provided by research participants must be treated as
such by sociologists, even when this information enjoys no legal protections or
privilege and legal force is applied.”46
The district court referred extensively to the amicus brief in its opinion
quashing the grand jury subpoena, but the amici’s triumph was short-lived.  The
appellate court, while acknowledging that the record contained “statements by
scholars asserting in the abstract the need for” a scholar’s privilege, declined to
decide whether such a privilege could be asserted under Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.  If such a privilege is cognizable, the court indicated, one who
invokes it must not only describe the nature and seriousness of the study and the
methodology employed, but must make at least a “threshold showing … of the
need for assurances of confidentiality to various sources to conduct the study, and
of the fact that the disclosure requested by the subpoena will seriously impinge
upon that confidentiality.”47  On the record before it, the appellate court con-
cluded that there had been no such showing.  Consequently, the appellate court
reversed and remanded the matter to the district court to allow Mr. Brajuha to
designate those portions of the journal he argued were privileged; after in camera
inspection, the district court could order appropriate redactions.  Nonprivileged
portions of the journal were to be disclosed, and the court cautioned: “Actual ob-
servation of criminal activity is not subject to a claim of privilege.”48  In the end,
the federal prosecutor accepted production of the journal edited by Mr. Brajuha
to remove privileged material as full compliance with the subpoena.
The same types of concerns about disclosure’s impact on the future flow of in-
formation to researchers were advanced by archivists who argued against com-
pelled disclosure of personal archives in Wilkinson v.  Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation.  That case concerned the extensive files of information collected and
generated by Anne Braden over many years of activism with her husband Carl
Braden.  Ms. Braden had donated these papers to the Wisconsin State Historical
Society with the restriction that the Society would grant others access to the
documents only with her permission.  This access agreement, renewable at five-
year intervals, required the Historical Society to oppose to a reasonable extent
any subpoena seeking the Braden papers without her consent.
In light of the access agreement between Ms. Braden and the Society, the
FBI’s subpoena was directed to her.  The Historical Society, however, argued that
once the Braden files were in the possession of the Society, they were protected
from disclosure by an archival privilege established by common law or by a Wis-
consin statute.  The district court rejected this argument, noting that even if the
Wisconsin legislature intended to create such a privilege, state privilege law was
not controlling because the underlying claims in the case were based on federal,
                                                          
46. AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS § I.E.5 (1982) (emphasis added).
47. In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated January 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 226.
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not Wisconsin, law.  The Wilkinson court did not decide whether a researcher’s
privilege was cognizable, because it ruled that any such privilege would not apply
in this case because Ms. Braden was not a third-party researcher.
As Ms. Braden was a member of the plaintiff class, her own situation (unlike
the Historical Society’s) was more akin to that of a research participant who later
becomes a litigant.  For example, the DES Registry contained medical informa-
tion about certain individual plaintiffs in the Andrews/Deitchman cases.  As these
plaintiffs had freely disclosed all relevant medical information from other
sources, the Andrews court concluded that the plaintiffs themselves did not con-
sider the information confidential.  Further, the plaintiffs raised no privilege
claim.  Accordingly, the court ordered Dr. Herbst to release any records relating
to the individual plaintiffs or their mothers.
Consider, however, the situation where a patient/plaintiff does not consent to
release of medical records because such records could jeopardize the plaintiff’s
case.  For example, suppose data collected in a longitudinal study would reveal a
long history of heavy smoking by a former asbestos worker.  The principle that
medical records belong to the patient would lead some medical researchers to di-
vulge the information only to the patient’s representatives.  Absent a statute to
the contrary, however, such information should be fully discoverable by the de-
fendant because it is by the researcher’s own definition within the patient’s con-
trol, even if not in his possession or custody.49  Although some medical practitio-
ners believe they can or must protect the identity of their patients as well as
details about their medical status, such a position may not be well founded.50  It is
unclear why, in the ordinary situation, the names of research participants who are
party litigants are entitled to more protection.  This is not to suggest that the
medical researcher should produce a list of all participants in a study.  Indeed,
simply being identified as a participant in some studies would disclose private in-
formation such as a medical condition.  Rather, it seems reasonable that a re-
searcher should be required to reveal, when properly asked, whether an identi-
fied litigant was a participant in the researcher’s study.  A researcher in
possession (and, in the case of a deceased participant, potentially sole possession)
of a fact relevant to a pending case should be as susceptible as any other fact wit-
ness to questions about a party litigant.
Would the inability to promise participants unconditional confidentiality im-
pede the flow of information?  Although it is often argued that confidentiality is
necessary to ensure the future flow of candid, complete information to research-
ers, empirical support for this proposition is seldom presented to the courts.
When the CDC argues that disclosure will inhibit future research, for example, it
typically submits affidavits to that effect from a CDC researcher or high-ranking
administrator.  The Assistant U.S. Attorney who has argued these cases for the
CDC indicated that she knew of no empirical support for the proposition that
                                                          
49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
50. Jeffrey A. Klotz, Limiting the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Therapeutic Potential, 27
CRIM. LAW BULL. 416, 432-33 (1991).
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disclosure actually affected the amount or quality of information the CDC could
obtain.  She maintains, however, that numerous statutes protecting the private
deliberations of such bodies as medical staff review boards, as well as those pro-
tecting certain kinds of public health reports, reflect a codification of a widely-
held, common-sense belief that confidentiality is essential to candid, accurate re-
porting.
Because disclosure was ordered in relatively few of the reviewed cases, our
respondents could shed only a little light on the issue.  Dr. Herbst reported that,
as predicted in the affidavits he submitted, some physicians who became aware of
the dispute over the DES Registry records stopped sending information to the
Registry, even though identifying information has not been released.  Harold
Miller, archivist at the Wisconsin State Historical Society, reported that Anne
Braden said that had she foreseen the dispute with the FBI, she would have do-
nated her papers to the society, but might have screened them more carefully.
To be sure, the inhibitory effects of information disclosure or lack of confi-
dentiality may be difficult for individual researchers to document, and the search
for such effects would lead many researchers off in directions other than their
main interests.  Dr. Selikoff noted that it was “up to the medical sociologists” to
investigate this area.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the evidence
already adduced on the question.  Generally speaking, evidence suggests that the
common sense notion that research participants will be less available, less coop-
erative, and less candid without an assurance of confidentiality is probably an
overly simplistic description of reality.51  For example, one study found that an as-
surance of confidentiality does enhance response rate and quality, but only when
the information requested is sensitive.52
Despite the concern of the researchers with whom we spoke about privacy
and disclosure issues, they did not report changing their data collection or storage
procedures to protect research participants better.  (From the outset, Dr. Potts
had collected and stored his data so that the confidentiality of the research par-
ticipants would be protected in the event of compelled disclosure.)  Similarly,
none of the researchers reported changing the nature of the confidentiality assur-
ances provided to research participants.  In light of the vulnerability of research
data to discovery and the increasing vulnerability of researchers to charges of
misrepresentation or breach of contract for violating promises of confidentiality,
researchers should keep in mind that courts are more likely to protect the identity
of research participants than the information they provide.  Thus, researchers
should fashion their confidentiality assurances accordingly.53  Further, researchers
should consider when designing a research project how to collect and store data
                                                          
51. See Joe S. Cecil & Robert F. Boruch, Compelled Disclosure of Research Data: An Early
Warning and Suggestions for Psychologists, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181 (1988); Singer et al., supra
note 43, at 74-75.
52. Singer et al., supra note 43, at 74.
53. For a discussion of the relevant case law and suggestions for avoiding such suits, see Traynor,
supra note 1.
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so as to minimize, to the extent possible, participant identifiability.54 Such fore-
thought is also likely to minimize the burden on the researcher should production
of the data later be required.
IV
DISCLOSING INCOMPLETE AND UNPUBLISHED RESEARCH FINDINGS
Most of the researchers with whom we spoke distinguished between data un-
derlying published studies and data underlying incomplete and unpublished
studies.  At least one researcher thought that as long as scientific information is
trustworthy (presumably in the opinion of the researcher), its publication status is
irrelevant in determining whether it should be disclosed.  Among our other re-
spondents, there was general agreement that, subject to the resolution of partici-
pant confidentiality concerns, researchers have an ethical and scientific responsi-
bility to make available data on which a published report is based, but many
believed that information about unpublished or incomplete research should not
be disclosed.  These categorical distinctions are not always clear.  Reports may be
published throughout the life of a project, particularly if a longitudinal study is
underway.  For example, the Chicago DES Registry contains both data underly-
ing published reports and newer, unanalyzed data.
Courts should distinguish research that is incomplete and inconclusive from
research that is complete but unpublished.  In all but rare instances, incomplete
research will not be probative of any matter in dispute, and therefore should not
be admissible.55 Nor is incomplete research a proper foundation for expert testi-
mony, as it is not reasonably relied on by experts in forming opinions or infer-
ences.56 Consequently, there is seldom a need for any party to the lawsuit to ob-
tain access to data or other information relating to incomplete research.  In
contrast, the findings of complete but unpublished research may provide reliable
information to the fact-finder and may, under some circumstances, be reasonably
relied upon by experts in forming an opinion.  The lag between completion of a
study and publication of its results may be substantial.  Moreover, there are nu-
merous reasons for non-publication, some of which have nothing to do with the
conclusiveness or quality of the research.
Premature release of data from ongoing research may make completion of
the study difficult or impossible, and may perpetuate unsubstantiated and possi-
bly invalid scientific conclusions.  Because the research is incomplete, the re-
searchers themselves can provide at best only tentative interpretations of the
data.  Research that is complete but unpublished also may be subject to misinter-
                                                          
54. See ROBERT F. BORUCH & JOE S. CECIL, ASSURING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOCIAL
RESEARCH DATA chs. 4-9 (1979).
55. One can imagine exceptional circumstances in which claims that research is incomplete may
raise suspicions that the withheld information might constitute legitimate fodder for cross-
examination, particularly to attack the credibility of witnesses. One such circumstance might be where
a party claims that research was abandoned or not published because its likely results would be con-
trary to the interests of its sponsors.
56. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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pretation, and thus requires more scrutiny by the court than published work.
Misinterpretation is especially likely if the original researchers are not given ade-
quate opportunity to explain their own findings.  Even when given such an oppor-
tunity, some researchers may feel uncomfortable describing their research pub-
licly before it has been peer-reviewed, because to do so does not comport with
their perceived ethical and scientific responsibilities.
The consequences to researchers of releasing incomplete or unpublished data
may be serious and far-reaching.  Researchers’ professional reputations may be
damaged if they do not complete and present their work to the scientific commu-
nity, if they fail to receive sufficient credit for their work, and if faulty interpreta-
tions of their research are attributed to them.  Young scientists may be affected
especially harshly by compelled disclosure of their work; disclosure may interfere,
for example, with the ability of graduate students to complete their degrees or of
young professors to obtain tenure.
Courts have been reasonably sensitive to these issues.  In Dow Chemical,
where no human subjects were involved, the researchers’ primary concerns re-
lated to release of data from an ongoing, unpublished study.  As researcher Van
Miller said, “academic data can be a person’s life and future and must be consid-
ered in that light.”  The district court judge quashed the subpoena, saying:
I take judicial notice that it would be a substantial burden on respondents to force
them to produce the information requested from the 5 ppt and 25 ppt studies which
are nowhere near completion and which have not been subjected to peer review.  In
the early stages of any research project there are likely to be false leads or problems
which will be resolved in the course of the study with no ultimate adverse effect on
the validity of the study.  To force production of all information demanded by the
subpoenas is likely to jeopardize the study by exposing it to the criticism of those
whose interest it may ultimately adversely affect, before there has been an opportu-
nity for the researchers themselves to make sure the study is the result of their best ef-
forts.  This is not the kind of burden which can be lightened by a protective order.
Putting this study in jeopardy would be a heavy burden not only on those involved in
the research, but also on the public which has helped to fund it through tax money
and which ultimately stands to gain from knowledge of the final results.57
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the district court should have properly
considered the subpoena’s “chilling effect” on academic freedom in reaching its
decision; a concurring opinion did not join in the discussion of academic free-
dom.58
The Andrews court was similarly sympathetic to such an argument.  In that
case, Squibb’s subpoena sought production not only of data for a study still in
progress, but of all drafts and analyses related to such studies “no matter how
tentative.”  Dr. Herbst submitted affidavits describing the problems created by
premature disclosure of research.  As affiant Leonard T. Kurland of the Mayo
Clinic explained:
Disclosure of information from ongoing epidemiological research can seriously un-
dermine the study since premature disclosure of information, before valid conclusions
                                                          
57. Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 494 F. Supp. 107, 113 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
58. 672 F.2d 1262, 1276 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Robert M. O’Neil, A Researcher’s Privilege: Does
Any Hope Remain?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35 (Summer 1996).
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can be reached by the researchers, may suggest faulty conclusions.  These in turn may
improperly discredit the study.  On the other hand, given an opportunity to complete
the research unobstructed by disclosure request[s], would have the greatest likelihood
of achieving tested and supported conclusions.  Any forced premature disclosure
could subject the researchers to professional ridicule and criticism.59
The district court accepted the argument that disclosure of tentative analyses
and results could adversely affect researchers’ free exchange of thoughts and
speculations about ongoing research.  To illustrate the point, the court quoted the
affidavit of researcher Robert E.  Scully, submitted by Dr. Herbst:
Epidemiological investigators, and indeed medical investigators in general, pursuing
the spirit of scientific inquiry, often speculate, hypothesize, and draw possible and
probable conclusions as they probe various questions related to their research.  Free-
dom to proceed in this manner requires confidentiality.  Involuntary disclosure of this
uninhibited communication among scientists to parties that are not participants in the
research demolishes the freedom of thought and interchange of ideas that is so essen-
tial to productive research.  Also, interpretation of the speculations, hypotheses, and
possible or probable conclusions by outsiders carries a serious risk of being faulty, re-
sulting in medical misinformation and possibly unjustifiably discrediting the investiga-
tors.60
The Andrews court also quoted the section of the district court’s opinion in
Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen set forth above and noted that the court of appeals
had fully approved of the district court’s approach in that case.  Although the
court of appeals vacated the Andrews court’s order, it did acknowledge the
court’s duty, when possible, to guard against premature publicity of tentative re-
search and disclosure of ongoing development of ideas.  With a nod to its decision
in Dow Chemical, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Dr. Herbst’s questionnaires,
protocols, and analyses should be discoverable, but limited discovery of such ma-
terial to that which it called “wholly factual.”  Even as to such nonconfidential
items, the court refrained from ordering discovery of “any material reflecting de-
velopment of Dr. Herbst’s ideas or stating his or others’ conclusions not yet pub-
lished.”61
V
BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF RESEARCHERS AND LITIGANTS
Attention to the researchers’ experiences and concerns can help courts focus
on factors to be considered when deciding whether to quash or modify subpoe-
nas.  Similarly, the experiences of the researchers and attorneys we interviewed,
as well as the published opinions, suggest ways courts might ease the burden on
researchers who are required to turn over information at the request of litigants,
including protective orders, document depositories, and neutral information bro-
kers.
Researchers expressed frustration with and ignorance of the legal system in
general, and third-party discovery in particular.  Several of them properly ques-
                                                          
59. Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494, 502-03 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
60. Id. at 503.
61. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 565 (7th Cir. 1984).
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tioned the breadth of the subpoenas they received, particularly if the subpoena
encompassed identifying information about data sources.  On the whole, the re-
searchers were willing to supply information they believed would be used, and
used properly, if the information seemed important to the issues being litigated.
For example, Dr. Potts reported that he would have gladly shared information
about the relevant study with the plaintiffs, including protocols, summary tables,
and raw data if needed, had the information been subpoenaed in a reasonable
way.  However, the subpoena as drafted was so overbroad that he was compelled
from a practical standpoint to oppose it.
Researchers are likely to view a subpoena as a nonnegotiable command of
the court.  Most attorneys, on the other hand, view the scope of the subpoena’s
document request as an opening bid.  Attorneys accustomed to opponents who
construe discovery requests narrowly to avoid producing evidence will err on the
side of over-inclusiveness.  This tendency to ask for all conceivably relevant in-
formation may be compounded by the attorney’s ignorance of the research proc-
ess.  Fortunately, the 1991 amendments to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires subpoenas to include information about protections available
to unretained experts and witnesses who are served with subpoenas for research
information.
Other researchers were more concerned with the possibility that they would
be subjected to an endless number of subpoenas.  For example, Mount Sinai’s
counsel said that there were about 1,000 cases similar to those underlying the two
published opinions involving the Selikoff studies.  Dr. Selikoff and the Medical
School were concerned that they would receive requests in all of these cases and
that Dr. Selikoff might feel compelled to defend his professional reputation re-
peatedly in court if opposing experts criticized his work.  Similarly, multiple suits
involving utility vehicles could generate duplicative subpoenas to Professor Sny-
der for records and testimony about his study.  The latest published opinion
quashing a subpoena to him acknowledged this burden:
Snyder has incurred the legal expense and personal disruption required to respond to
such subpoenas on at least four occasions.  Snyder’s counsel alleged that there are as
many as eighty-eight suits involving utility vehicles pending in federal courts.  Further,
other makers of utility vehicles might also have an interest in drafting Snyder’s exper-
tise, because his report was critical of several makes in addition to Jeep.62
Researchers also exhibited a frustration with lawyers’ ignorance of science.
Two researchers suggested that judges need to be aware of scientific practices
that protect the integrity of research findings.  Most scientific laboratories, for
example, have internal procedures to ensure the reliability of data.  In addition,
science’s mechanism for verifying research findings is replication.  If multiple re-
searchers reach the same basic conclusions, it is assumed that the methods used
by any one of them are sound.  Thus, there is little need to release overly detailed
information about any given study.
In cases where participant identity is irrelevant to the requesting party, the re-
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searcher’s desire or duty to protect the privacy of study participants creates a
burden that varies depending on data collection and storage methods, the scope
of the study, and other factors.  In most of the cases we examined, removal of
identifying information was a workable, if sometimes expensive, option.  The re-
search population had been large enough that tracing the identity of participants
from the remaining information would be (or could be made) extremely difficult.
In some kinds of research (for example, small scale epidemiological studies
and qualitative field studies), removing the usual identifiers is insufficient to pre-
clude recipients of the information from tracing data sources.63  In these instances,
the court may be able to craft an order to protect the privacy of the participants.
In American Tobacco Company, for example, the court ordered production of
computer tapes containing data underlying two published studies, but allowed
Mount Sinai to remove from the data the names, addresses, town or village of
residence, social security number, and union registration numbers of patients, and
the names of their employers.  Although the court denied Mount Sinai’s request
also to remove data concerning patients’ county of residence and union local, and
to summarize birth and death data by decade, it entered an order prohibiting re-
cipients of the information from using the released data to identify research par-
ticipants.  Dr. Selikoff, however, expressed some skepticism about whether pro-
tective orders are sufficient to guard against unauthorized attempts to use the
produced information to ascertain improperly the identity of research partici-
pants, and suggested that courts should monitor vigilantly compliance with their
orders.
Transferring the data to a neutral third party may be useful when balancing
the interests of researchers and litigants, particularly when information about un-
published research is being sought.  For example, the researchers in Dow Chemi-
cal Co. v. Allen discussed the possibility of transferring the data to a neutral party
who could then report to the court on the issues raised by the subpoena, but nei-
ther Dow Chemical nor the administrative law judge would agree to this. 64 Where
there is some legitimate need to learn participant identities to validate research,
the neutral information broker approach also may serve as a scientific analogue
to the “attorneys’ eyes only” protective order sometimes used in trade secret liti-
gation.  This might prove especially useful where the discovering party also has
less legitimate reasons for trying to obtain information about research partici-
pants who are not yet litigants.
Finally, the use of a document depository was suggested by the court in Anker
v.  G.D.  Searle & Co.  as appropriate for multiple plaintiff litigation:
[I]f an expert gives one deposition and produces records, the court may protect the
non-party, involuntary expert by requiring that the party who conducts the deposition
keep such records and make them available to subsequent requesters.  Then other
courts may require potential inquisitors to show why a review of previously taken
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depositions and document production would not be sufficient to satisfy their needs.65
In the tobacco/asbestos litigation, for example, R.J. Reynolds agreed to serve
as a central depository for the information released about the Selikoff studies.
The court entered a protective order requiring Reynolds to notify Mount Sinai
and the American Cancer Society if any third party seeking the information re-
fused to execute an acknowledgment that would not attempt to identify the re-
search participants from the disclosed data.
VI
CONCLUSION
Our interviews and review of published opinions suggest that demands placed
on researchers by subpoenas for scientific information, while substantial, are not
necessarily any greater than those placed on other third-party recipients of sub-
poenas.  With sufficient sensitivity to the professional and scientific issues dis-
cussed above, courts can minimize litigation-related disruption of the develop-
ment of medical and scientific knowledge without denying litigants access to the
evidence necessary to legitimate claims and defenses.  Researchers also can learn
how to minimize litigation-related disruptions of their work from the experiences
of those whose work has been subpoenaed by anticipating the problems and
planning an appropriate response to requests or subpoenas for their data.
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APPENDIX
JUDICIALLY COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF RESEARCH DATA:
ISSUES TO BE EXPLORED
We addressed the issues raised by the following set of questions in our inter-
views of researchers and their attorneys.
General
1.  What was the nature of the information sought?  In what form?
Confidentiality
2.  Did you provide any assurance of confidentiality to participants in the
subpoenaed research?  If so, what was the nature of that assurance?
3.  If you were required to disclose any or all of the subpoenaed informa-
tion, what measures, if any, did you or the court take to protect the privacy of
the research participants?  Were such measures adequate?  What other proce-
dures would you have liked the court to order or the parties to adopt?
4.  Since the subpoena, have you changed the nature of assurances that you
give to research participants?  Have you changed the way you maintain data?
What effect do you think these changes have had on your research?
Financial and Non-Financial Burdens
5.  What monetary and non-monetary costs were or would have been in-
volved in supplying the requested documents?  How could or did the court help
minimize these costs?  If you were required to produce documents, were you
adequately compensated?
6.  If you were deposed or if you testified in court, were you adequately
compensated for the time you spent in preparation and in deposition or trial?
7.  What type of support, if any, was offered by your institution, by profes-
sional groups, or by a party to the litigation?  For example, did they help defray
your legal expenses?
Legal Procedure and Outcome
8.  Did the party seeking the information ask you to produce the informa-
tion voluntarily before they subpoenaed you?  Did you negotiate with that
party to narrow the scope of the subpoena?
9.  Was there other information that could have been substituted for the in-
formation sought?  For example, did scientists independent of your research
group have sufficient access to your work to confirm the accuracy of your data,
analyses, or conclusions?
10.  Did you have sufficient opportunity to present your position to the
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court?  What issues, if any, did the court ignore or fail to give proper weight?
Professional Costs
11.  Was the research completed when you received the subpoena?  If not,
what effect did the subpoena have on its completion?
12.  At the time of the subpoena, had you published any articles on the re-
search findings?  What effect, if any, did the subpoena have on your publication
plans?
13.  Have you changed your areas of research or your research practices as a
result of this experience?  Were your other research, teaching, or professional
activities disrupted?
14.  Was this experience unique or have you faced similar situations before
or since the one described?
Other Questions
15.  Do you know of other researchers who have faced situations similar to
yours?  Have you advised them?  What is (or would be) the nature of your ad-
vice to other researchers in like situations?
16.  Can you suggest alternatives to compelling researchers to testify or to
turn over information to litigants who request it?  Would you prefer to transfer
the data to a neutral broker who could then report to the court on the issues
raised by the litigant?  Would you prefer to testify as a neutral expert ap-
pointed by the court?
17.  What advice do you have for judges who must balance the interests of
researchers, research participants, and litigants when science has produced in-
formation relevant to a lawsuit?
